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Trouble on Track Two: Incidental




I. Introduction: Track One and Track Two First
Amendment Analyses
Standard First Amendment free speech analysis divides cases into
two major groups. One group consists of those cases that Laurence Tribe
has labeled "track one" cases.1 In track one cases, the government's con-
cern expressed in the challenged regulation is the communicative impact
of speech, the messages that the audience for the speech will receive.
Those messages may be objectionable from the government's standpoint
for many reasons, some legitimate, others not. First, the messages may
induce the audience to violate the law. Second, the messages may create
in the audience's mind false and derogatory impressions of other people,
reveal private and embarrassing facts about them, disclose confidential or
classified information, or represent appropriations of others' creative en-
deavors. Third, the government may be concerned that the audience,
through the messages, will learn the truth about the government's own
misfeasance or nonfeasance. Finally, the government may be interested
in preventing the audience from having false beliefs about certain sub-
jects, not for the sake of some further harms to which those beliefs might
lead, but because of a concern with truth for its own sake.
2
Track one analysis, inquiring what governmental purposes are legiti-
mate bases for interdicting the receipt of messages, and what means the
government may employ to accomplish those purposes, is difficult, com-
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I would like to thank Robert Post, Fred
Schauer, Chris Wonnell, Fred Zacharias, and those colleagues who attended the work-in-pro-
gress workshop at University of San Diego at which I presented the initial outline of this
article. I am also heavily indebted to Scott Oliver for his able research assistance.
1. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 791 (2d ed.
1988).
2. This is less likely to be advanced as a reason for restricting speech in a secular era.
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plex, and controversial. It divides both courts and commentators along
many lines. Yet despite its difficulty, complexity, and controversiality,
track one analysis is relatively stable doctrinally if not theoretically.
While courts and commentators may disagree over the outcomes of
many of those cases that because of their difficulty actually get litigated
or over the theoretical bases for the decisions, the courts and commenta-
tors do agree on the outcomes in the vast majority of possible cases.
Moreover, almost all observers would agree that track one analysis is
extremely speech protective. The government is rarely successful in
meeting track one's relatively settled tests for when it may legitimately
interdict receipt of a message based upon a concern with the message's
effect on the audience. Courts have protected speech that advocates
crime, defames, discloses secrets or private matters, threatens fair trials,
offends, threatens, or insults.3 Speech can be regulated on track one only
when it falls within a few narrow categories.4 Indeed, most liberal com-
mentary today concerning track one urges less rather than more free
3. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (threatening speech);
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (speech threatening fair trial); Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (speech threatening privacy); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989) (offensive speech); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (insulting
speech); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (confidential com-
munications); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (speech threatening fair
trial); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (speech threatening privacy);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (offensive speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (advocacy of illegal action); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(defamation).
4. Cases in which the Supreme Court has allowed, or said it would allow, regulation of
track one speech include those in which the speech constitutes: incitement, see Brandenburg,
395 U.S. 444, fighting words, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), obscen-
ity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), confidential communications (in some in-
stances), see Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 45, defamation (in some instances), see
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), invasion of privacy (in some instances), see
Cox, 420 U.S. at 491, Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532-33; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982), revelation of secret information (in some instances), see
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725-27 (1971), false or deceptive advertis-
ing, see Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), advertising of harmful or illegal products or
transactions, see Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), coercion (in some in-
stances), see International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212 (1982); Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc.,
354 U.S. 284 (1975), and speech internal to the workplace (in some instances), see N.L.R.B. v.
Gissel, 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The Court would undoubtedly affirm, in the face of free speech
challenges, convictions for perjury, criminal solicitation, criminal conspiracy, and misrepresen-
tation. See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 132, 239-
80, 315-21 (1989).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
April 1993] TROUBLE ON TRACK TWO
speech protection, particularly with respect to pornography, hate speech,
harassing speech, defamation, invasion of privacy, and corporate speech.
5
The other major group of First Amendment free speech cases con-
sists of Tribe's "track two" cases. 6 Here, government is concerned with
the noncommunicative impact of speech, not the message that is being
conveyed.
7
Track two cases have traditionally been broken into two subcatego-
ries: the public forum cases and the symbolic speech cases. The former
concern access of private speakers to governmental or quasi-governmen-
tal facilities, and in some cases to private facilities that the speaker seeks
to have treated like governmental facilities.8 Current First Amendment
jurisprudence distinguishes among traditional public fora, such as streets,
sidewalks, and parks, public fora created by government designation, and
nonpublic fora.9 The conventional doctrine in public forum cases is that
the government may impose narrowly drawn regulations of the time,
place, and manner of speech in traditional public fora and designated
public fora in order to serve significant governmental objectives unrelated
to the speaker's message. The government may not, however, bar speech
5. See, eg., Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII on Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harass-
ment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991) (harassing speech); Richard Del-
gado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982) (hate speech); Marc A. Franklin, Constitutional Libel
Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1657 (1987) (defamation); Thomas C. Grey,
Civil Rights vs Civil Liberties: The Case of Discriminatory Verbal Harassment, 8 SOC. PHIL. &
POL'Y 81 (1991) (hate speech); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulat-
ing Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (hate speech); Frederick Schauer, Reflec-
tions on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 699 (1991) (defamation and privacy);
Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589 (pornography).
6. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-2, at 792.
7. The Court has sometimes treated as track two cases those that, properly analyzed,
belong on track one. For example, in the adult entertainment cases-City of Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1991), and Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50 (1976)-the harms the cities were attempting to prevent were traceable to the communica-
tive impact of the adult entertainment, yet the Court treated the regulations as though they
were dealing with noncommunicative impact. In the recently decided case of Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991), the Court treated the regulation of public nudity as a
track two regulation, though careful analysis would suggest that the harms about which the
government was concerned depended upon the message conveyed by the nudity.
8. Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (proscribing regulation of speech in
a company town) with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (allowing ban on picketers at
privately owned shopping center).
9. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985);
G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case ofthe Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 949, 954.
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992), four
Justices, Kennedy, Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens, would have held that airports, as well as
other facilities, were public fora. Id. at 2715-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring in Judgment); id. at
2724 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting).
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entirely from such public fora and must leave adequate alternative chan-
nels of communication available. 10 On the other hand, if a facility is a
nonpublic forum, the government may bar speech entirely or selectively,
so long as it does not discriminate according to viewpoint.11
Public forum cases are more complicated, however, than the preced-
ing account indicates. First, alternative channels of communication are
never entirely adequate. Thus, all regulations of the public fora will en-
tirely suppress speech with respect to some potential audience and with a
particular cognitive and emotive impact. Second, the analysis leaves un-
resolved whether the government must make a certain quantum of tradi-
tional public fora available, whether it must construct such fora if few are
available or be prevented from razing those that are available, or whether
it need only maintain those available as of a certain date or those of a
certain vintage. 12 Lastly, the Court has recognized that, with respect to
designated public fora, the government may and often has opened fora to
speech on a limited basis. The Court has found no First Amendment
violation where the government creates fora for speech of all kinds but
for only certain speakers. 13 It has similarly found no violation where the
government creates fora for speech on some subjects but not others.
14
Lastly, it has upheld the government's creation of fora for only those
viewpoints the government favors, as when it runs public schools. 15 This
offends the asserted doctrine that even in nonpublic fora, government
may not engage in viewpoint discrimination.
The other subcategory of track two cases consists of the symbolic
speech cases. 16 Here, the government forbids certain conduct irrespec-
10. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-802 (1989); Buchanan, supra note
9, at 954. It need not, however, choose the least restrictive means available. See Ward, 491
U.S. at 796-802; Buchanan, supra note 9, at 954.
11. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
12. The Court in Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, suggests in dicta that the government may fail to
construct public fora and may convert public fora into other facilities; the only restrictions
track two analysis imposes upon the government in this regard concern public fora that are
currently in existence. Id. at 2706-07; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13. See Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984);
Buchanan, supra note 9, at 959-60. But see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (univer-
sity cannot bar religious speech from university facilities).
14. A public hospital's bulletin board can be limited to posting notices concerning hospi-
tal business; and a public school classroom discussion can be restricted to subjects in the cur-
riculum. See Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School
Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976) (public school
newspaper is part of curriculum).
15. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Board of Educ. v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853 (1982); Goldstein, supra note 14.
16. Given that all speech employs symbols and is thus symbolic, the area should perhaps
be redescribed.
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tive of whether those who would otherwise engage in that conduct intend
their engaging in it to symbolize and communicate some idea to others.
The free speech issue arises when someone in fact wishes to engage in
that conduct to symbolize and communicate an idea. The accepted doc-
trine is that government may regulate the symbol on the same grounds
and with the same restrictions as it may regulate the time, place, and
manner of speech in a public forum. That is, it may do so if it is advanc-
ing a significant interest unrelated to the communicative impact of the
conduct, if its statute is narrowly tailored, and if adequate alternative
means exist for the speaker to convey his message. 17
Unlike track one analysis, track two analysis has not proven to be
speech protective, at least not as we normally think of speech protective
doctrines. The government has always won track two cases, with two
clear and two less clear exceptions. 18 The clear exceptions are the deci-
sions in Schneider v. State,19 which struck down anti-littering ordinances
as applied to the passing out of pamphlets, 20 and International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,21 which upheld the right to distribute
literature in an airport terminal.22 The less clear exceptions are the
Court's decisions in Hague v. CIO,23 which established the speech ease-
ment over public streets, sidewalks, and parks,24 and Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim,25  which overturned a complete ban of live
entertainment.
26
17. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Buchanan, supra note 9, at 953.
18. In addition to the exceptions discussed in the text, the government has also lost those
cases challenging licensing schemes, which have constitutional defects related to the track one
fear of message censorship. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
19. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
20. Id. at 162.
21. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
22. Id. at 2713-14.
23. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
24. Id. at 514-15.
25. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
26. Id. at 67-77. Arguably, Schad is a track one case, since the effects with which Mount
Ephraim was concerned were not unrelated to the fact that messages were being conveyed.
(Consider what "entertainment" is.) Schad is what Schneider would have been had the ordi-
nances in the latter banned distributing pamphlets but not distributing blank sheets of paper,
equally litterable but not message-bearing.
Lee could have struck down the airport authority's ban on the sale and distribution of
literature on the ground that the sale and distribution of literature caused no more congestion
than the sale and distribution of other items, rendering the ordinance underinclusive and hence
discriminatory against communication as an activity. The Court's actual analysis implies,
however, that a broader ban on all potentially congesting sales and distributions of items
would have been unconstitutional as applied to the sale and distribution of literature, making
Lee analogous in that regard to Schneider.
April 1993]
Moreover, recent case developments have perhaps eviscerated
whatever little speech-protective force track two might have had. United
States v. Kokinda,27 upholding the Postal Service's banning of petition
signature gatherers from sidewalks on postal service property, 2 coupled
with the Court's prior approval of noise restrictions on city streets,29 tres-
pass laws' application to speakers on shopping center property,30 and
bans on residential picketing,31 leaves almost nothing to Hague's speech
easement over streets, sidewalks, and parks. O'Brien's32 promise of a
free speech exemption from regulations of conduct in circumstances
where the conduct conveys a symbolic message may have been nipped in
its latency by Barnes v. Glen Theatres.33 And Schneider's future force
was rendered doubtful by City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,34 though
revived to some extent by Lee.35
Although Tribe does not describe it as such, there is actually a track
three in free speech jurisprudence. On this track are the cases where
government is using the mechanisms of the affirmative state, not to cen-
sor others' messages, but to communicate its own messages, either di-
rectly, as when it runs public schools,36 libraries, 37 or theatres, 38 or by
subsidizing private parties who agree to promote its messages. 39 Track
Three cases, like other "unconstitutional conditions" cases, 4 involve the
intersection of constitutionally optional benefits characteristic of the
modem affirmative state-for example, public schools and libraries-and
constitutional liberties established against the background of the very
27. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
28. Id. at 731-37.
29. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78-79 (1949).
30. See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
31. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
32. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
33. Ill S.Ct. 2456, 2457 (1991).
34. 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding ordinance banning posters from utility poles).
35. In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S.Ct. 2701
(1992), five justices, Blackmun, Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens, were willing to im-
pose some inconveniences--congestion and potential littering-on the operators of airports
and their customers so as to allow the Hare Krishnas and others to get their messages to
whatever audience they could gather in the airports. Id. at 2715-16. The other justices, Rehn-
quist, White, Scalia, and Thomas, did not regard the airports as public fora like streets, side-
walks, and parks, and thus did not express an opinion on the current status of Schneider and
restrictions on speech in public fora. Id. at 2710 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
36. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
37. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
38. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
39. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1762-63 (1991).
40. See Unconstitutional Conditions Symposium, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989).
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minimal state.41 Track three is perhaps more accurately described as
track one and one-hal, because it involves a blend of track one's concern
with government's control of messages and track two's concern with'gov-
ernment's allocation of resources.
My principal focus in this Essay will be on track two. In the next
Part, I intend to show that track two is much more expansive than is
realized, and is central to the quantity and quality of available informa-
tion and to the quality of public debate and discourse.
In Part III, I intend to show that the failure of track two analysis to
be speech protective was inevitable. Track two analysis must of necessity
involve some kind of balancing. But speech interests cannot be balanced
against those the government is attempting to foster through its track
two regulations because balancing involves someone's prejudging the
outcome that the First Amendment demands not be prejudged. In a
sense, and somewhat counterintuitively, the First Amendment dictates
that speech not be treated as important (or as unimportant).
Finally, in Part IV, I examine somewhat more speculatively the im-
plications the track two analysis proposed in Part III carries for track
one and track three cases, and for First Amendment theory generally.
H. The Entire Corpus Juris as Track Two
I will establish two propositions in this Part. The first, and easier to
establish, is that the public forum cases and the symbolic speech cases
have been, and should be, treated under the same standards. The second
is that track two analysis potentially covers challenges to any law. In
other words, the entire body of laws is subject to track two First Amend-
ment analysis.
An examination of both the phrasing and application of the
Supreme Court's time, place, and manner test for public forum speech
and its test for regulation of symbolic speech reveals that they are essen-
tially the same test. Both tests, as stated, require that the regulation in
question be narrowly tailored but not that it be the least restrictive alter-
native.42 Moreover, in both tests the government's objectives must be
significant, and the government must leave the speaker adequate alterna-
tive means to convey the message.43
41. I address the general topic in a forthcoming piece on constitutionally optional
benefits.
42. See supra notes 10, 17 and accompanying text.
43. Id The Supreme Court itself has recently recognized the similarity of its time, place,
and manner test and its symbolic speech test. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 798 (1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1984).
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Regardless of the test it employs, the Court is correct, from a theo-
retical standpoint, in employing the same test for both areas. Whenever
government is regulating conduct that is being engaged in as a symbol, it
is regulating the "time, place, and manner" of speech. It is easy enough
to see that, for example, burning a draft card or dancing in the nude is
employing a particular manner of expression to symbolize a message.
However, the time of a speech or demonstration or the place in which it
occurs may also be employed symbolically.
Susan Williams has recently noted the Supreme Court's erosion of
any distinction between its time, place, and manner and symbolic speech
tests.44 She nonetheless urges that a distinction should be maintained
between regulations that affect those aspects of time, place, and manner
that are merely "facilitative" of speech-that affect the speaker's ability
to convey his message to a particular audience-and regulations that af-
fect those aspects of time, place, and manner that are themselves "expres-
sive" (communicative)-that are part of the message itself.45 She argues
that there is never an adequate alternative available to the speaker when
the regulation affects the communicative aspect of speech and thus what
gets said.46 Therefore, she would require regulations of that type to meet
a higher standard of validity.
47
Nonetheless, it is both theoretically difficult and practically impossi-
ble to separate the uniqueness of a particular message from the unique-
ness of a particular audience at a particular time and place.48 The
Supreme Court has recognized how the choice between words having the
same denotative meaning can affect the emotive and ultimately the cogni-
tive significance to the audience, 49 and how the choice between verbal
and nonverbal symbols can do the same.50 Surely, the choice between
audiences and times affects not only the impact of a message, but also
how that message will be translated and understood. To illustrate this,
imagine delivering a talk on a given subject first to teenagers and then to
senior citizens, or first at 5 a.m. and then at 8 p.m. The facilitative and
the expressive, the media and the message, are ultimately inseparable.
44. Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 615, 644-45, 653-54 (1991).
45. Id. at 659-63.
46. Id. at 706.
47. Id. at 707-19.
48. Williams herself comes close to recognizing this proposition. Id. at 715-16.
49. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) ("one man's vulgarity is another's
lyric").
50. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2538-40 (1989) (burning a flag carries a
message subtly different from verbal denunciation).
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The second proposition I want to establish is that, just as there
should be no distinction between track two regulations affecting the
facilitative aspects of speech and those affecting the expressive aspects, so
too should there be no distinction between track two laws directly regu-
lating speech activities and all other laws. All track two laws regulate
speech only indirectly in this sense: In a track two case, government's
interest is not in what is being communicated but in the communication's
effects on values unrelated to communication, such as noise, congestion,
property, aesthetics, or privacy. Track two regulations are of First
Amendment concern because they affect what gets said, by whom, to
whom, and with what effect even though the regulations are not intended
to affect such matters. Nevertheless, all laws affect what gets said, by
whom, to whom, and with what effect. In short, all laws have information
effects. Therefore, all laws, the entire corpus juris, should be subject to
track two analysis.
Track two includes not only restrictions on obstructing traffic while
speaking or demonstrating, using amplifying devices in residential neigh-
borhoods, posting signs on utility poles, burning draft cards, or sleeping
in parks, but also includes tort, contract, and property law, the tax code,
and the multitude of criminal and regulatory laws and administrative
regulations. For example, laws determining who owns what property
under what restrictions or the price and availability of various resources
will also determine what gets said, by whom, to whom, and with what
effect-that is, the laws will have information effects. A change in the
laws of any region of the corpus juris will have information effects. Laws
equalizing income would surely have dramatic information effects. Elim-
ination of the law against battery would produce a new form of symbolic
speech as well as information-for example, what it is like to batter and
be battered-and concerns that do not exist while the law against battery
is on the books.
The ubiquity of potential track two cases has been noted.51 Susan
Williams, for example, notes that "[t]here is... no clear dividing line
between facilitative aspects of speech and other activities. Instead, there
is a continuum ... .,,52 Yet she believes that a line must be drawn.
The task is required ... because the alternatives are simply unaccept-
able. Some activities or resources that are not themselves a part of the
act of speaking are, nonetheless, so closely related to speech that it
would be absurd not to recognize that regulating them raises first
amendment issues. Access to paper or typewriters might be a good
51. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHi. L. Rav. 255, 273-77, 296 (1992);
Williams, supra note 44, at 658-59, 722-25.
52. Williams, supra note 44, at 724.
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example. On the other hand, without some limit, the free speech guar-
antee would be transformed into an invitation for all speakers to vio-
late any generally applicable law if the violation contributes in any
way, no matter how indirect, to their ability to speak. The constitu-
tional solicitude for free speech demands that speakers receive special
protection from regulations (even generally applicable ones) that affect
either a communicative or a directly facilitative aspect of their speech
activity. Nonetheless, at some point the connection to speech becomes
so attenuated that the protection must disappear.
53
Although Williams's concern is well-founded, the "direct-indirect" im-
agery on which she relies misses the fundamental point that the most
profound information effects are produced by laws she would place on
the indirect side of the divide. Cass Sunstein, on the other hand, is quite
anxious to exploit precisely this point:
[T]here may be no neutrality in use of the market status quo when the
available opportunities are heavily dependent on wealth, on the com-
mon law framework of entitlements, and on the sorts of outlets for
speech that are made available, and to whom. In other words, the very
notions "content-neutral" and "content-based" seem to depend on tak-
ing the status quo as if it were preregulatory and unobjectionable.
At least two things follow. The first is that many content-neutral
laws have content-differential effects. They do so because they operate
against a backdrop that is not prepolitical or just. In light of an unjust
status quo, rules that are content-neutral can have severe adverse ef-
fects on some forms of speech. Greater scrutiny of content-neutral re-
strictions is therefore appropriate. Above all, courts should attend to
the possibility that seemingly neutral restrictions will have content-
based effects.
54
As Williams recognizes, however, and Sunstein does not, the courts
cannot apply the ordinary track two test to all laws, even though all laws
are logically subject to track two analysis. For example, the setting of
the marginal tax rate affects my income, which, if greater, I might devote
to increased speaking. Under the current track two test, if the govern-
ment's interest in the present rate is not significant, and the rate ad-
versely affects my speech, the government would be required to abandon
that rate in favor of another rate. But any other rate the government
chooses will affect somebody's speech-it may result in lower transfer
payments, adversely affecting the communication between poorer speak-
ers and their audience-and, thus, it will have to serve a significant inter-
est as well. 55 Therefore, the track two test cannot be applied universally,
53. Id.
54. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 296 (footnotes omitted).
55. Moreover, all laws curtail the symbolic expression of opposition to the laws them-
selves through violations, a point that by itself undermines the possibility of requiring a signifi-
cant interest in order to restrict symbolic speech.
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unless the requirement of a significant government interest is trivialized
either by finding almost any interest to be significant or by being made
synonymous with "the entire corpus juris is what it should be." (The
latter trivializes because it tautologizes: track two laws are constitutional
if they are constitutional.)
This leaves the following problems. First, track two covers all laws
since all laws have information effects-they affect what gets said, by
whom, to whom, and with what effect. Second, a track two First
Amendment challenge to a law or group of laws is a demand that the
laws be changed; but every change in the laws will have information ef-
fects, so that track two First Amendment claims are always aligned
against each other. Thus, testing challenged laws by the significant gov-
ernment interest test will entail testing all of their alternatives by that
test. Finally, the universal application of track two analysis would result
in the elimination of all sets of laws except those serving significant inter-
ests (as compared to all possible alternative sets). Because of this diffi-
culty, the universal application of track two analysis would most likely
result in complete abandonment of track two protection, with all asserted
interests deemed "significant" so long as they are not concealing track
one, message-related, governmental concerns.56
I. The Inevitable Failure of Track Two Analysis
Track two laws have much greater information effects than track
one laws (if the concept of greater effects is meaningful in this context).
Yet, while track one analysis has been quite speech protective, at least
superficially, track two analysis has been anything but speech protective.
The preceding Part demonstrated that track two covers all laws that
incidentally affect speech-that is, all laws-and for that reason, the sig-
nificant government interest test is unworkable. The significant govern-
ment interest test treats all speakers, messages, and audiences as equally
important, of a constant weight in the constitutional balance equal to
that of significant government interests.
56. I treat the government's decision to ban conduct because it is message-bearing as a
track one decision, even if the government is not concerned with the content of the message.
In other words, government's concerns with paper-as-litter, book-as-merchandise, or newspa-
per-as-high-revenue-business are track two concerns when the government bans dispensing
paper on the streets, bans sales in airports, or imposes sales taxes. The government crosses
over to track one, however, when it singles out "pamphlets," "literature," or "newspapers."
See Frank I. Michelman, Property and the Politics of Distrust: Liberties, Fair Values, and Con-
stitutional Method, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 91, 108 n.56 (1992) (discussing discrimination against
speech as an activity and citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)).
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What happens if instead of treating all speech interests as having a
constant and significant weight, the particular value of the intended
speech, given its intended audience, is weighed against the values the par-
ticular laws serve? This is the heart of my critique of track two analysis.
In this Part, I propose that the value of speech cannot be balanced
against the government's track two interests in any way that is principled
and that respects the very freedom of thought that the First Amendment
itself protects.
To make track two analysis work, we must assign a value to the
audience's loss of information due to incidental restrictions on speech.
That value in turn must be weighed against the values furthered by the
incidental regulations at issue, values such as freedom from noise, litter,
congestion, and taxes. Moreover, that value must also be weighed
against the information lost to that and other audiences if the incidental
regulations are struck down. (Each alternative set of regulations pro-
duces a different state of the world, which in turn makes available differ-
ent information and/or different audiences for the same information. A
trivial example: a world without an anti-litter law lacks the information
"what a world with an anti-litter law is like." A less trivial example: a
world in which extra police must be assigned to monitor and control
street demonstrations and reroute traffic has less tax money available to
hire teachers in public schools than a world in which street demonstra-
tions are prohibited. 5
7)
In addition to the theoretical difficulties of the balancing process,
the track two analysis also poses the theoretical problem of placing a
value on the information at stake. On the one hand, if we evaluate the
information at stake from the position of not knowing yet what it is, we
face the theoretically impossible task of placing a specific value on un-
known information. On the other hand, if we evaluate the information at
stake from the position of knowing or imagining what it is, we risk im-
posing our evaluation on others through the striking down of the existing
set of incidental regulations, and, thereby preempting the very freedom
57. It is bootless to attempt to tote up the information gained and lost under alternative
sets of incidental restrictions. Information does not come in discrete units such that it would
be meaningful to compare states of the world in terms of which state has more information.
We can count up the number of television channels, the amount of time spent viewing televi-
sion, the number of magazines and books purchased, or the number of words in each; but
talking of the amount of information is meaningless. This point is frequently ignored. One
student note speaks of "a concern for maximizing information" and "concern for a laws' effect
on the net stock of information." The Supreme Court, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 177, 284-85 (1991). Maximizing the net stock of information in the global sense used
by the note is quite meaningless. All laws have information effects, but that is all one can say.
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of evaluation of others that is central to the First Amendment. In the
name of the First Amendment we are imposing an evaluative framework
on others and arguably violating the First Amendment. Put differently,
the First Amendment is supposed to protect a realm of pure process, the
substantive results of which are legitimate only because that process is
pure; once substantive results begin guiding the construction of the pro-
cess itself, the legitimacy of the results of that process is compromised.
58
The above argument is not one directed exclusively at courts. It
applies to all coercive impositions of such valuations of information and
thus suggests that legislative evaluation of information gains and losses is
equally problematic. It suggests that legislatures should perhaps mea-
sure only the strength of the constituents' preferences in deciding, for
instance, between open space suitable for speech and alternative land
uses. And it suggests that taxing one group because of another group's
preference for speech activities-for example, in building a town meeting
hall-is illegitimate to the extent its justification depends upon public
good derived from the speech. (Building a meeting hall, an auditorium,
or a library is non-problematic to the extent it reflects the majority's pri-
vate good preference for information of a certain type rather than, say,
more tennis courts.) Finally, when government itself speaks with taxpay-
ers' resources, it is evaluating specific information-the most problematic
of all government activities from a First Amendment standpoint. Public
schools and universities, public grants and subsidies for research, public
broadcasting, public financing of election campaigns, and a variety of
other activities, rather than being extensions of the animating spirit of the
First Amendment, are in tension with it.
I will discuss each of these points at greater length.
A. Balancing Speech Interests Against Non-Speech Values Served by
Incidental Regulations
The entire corpus juris, from the general common law of contracts,
property, and torts to the most particular tax regulation, affects what
gets said, by whom, to whom, and to what effect. Speech and listening
58. See Robert C. Post, Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of Democratic Dialogue,
103 ETHics (forthcoming July 1993) [hereinafter Post, Managing Deliberation]; Robert C.
Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267,
282-83, 290, 293 (1990) [hereinafter Post, Racist Speech]; Robert C. Post, The Constitutional
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Maga-
zine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. Rav. 601, 670 (1990) [hereinafter Post, Public Discourse]
("[T]he normative conception of public concern, insofar as it is used to exclude speech from
public discourse, is ... incompatible with the very democratic self-governance it seeks to
facilitate.").
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are costly activities. They use resources such as space, newsprint, radio
frequencies, presses, and police protection, and impose other costs-
noise, litter, and clutter. Schneider, for example, imposed the costs of
litter or, alternatively, the costs in excess of the state's next best alterna-
tive for eliminating litter. (If a less restrictive alternative is on the order
of a Pareto superior move-the alternative does all the good at no greater
cost and without affecting speech-then less restrictive alternatives are
unlikely to exist; all alternatives will have greater costs in some respects.)
Thus, the Court's decision in Schneider constitutionally mandated
what can be viewed as a subsidy of pamphleteers. But why such a sub-
sidy of pamphleteers? 59
Consider Jane, who complains about the high costs of The New Re-
public, cable television, books from Oxford Press, and a college educa-
tion. Those costs result from laws-laws regarding property rights, laws
conserving trees, laws affecting labor costs, laws regarding tax liability,
and many other laws. Jane's receipt of speech-which is, after all, what
the First Amendment is really about-is adversely affected by those laws.
Why should her attempt to receive this speech not be subsidized? (Alter-
natively, if one resists the notion that listeners' rights are central to the
First Amendment, why should The New Republic and Oxford Press, for
example, not receive subsidies or relief from various laws in order to
communicate with a wider audience?)
Next, consider John, who wishes to demonstrate on Main Street,
which will tie up traffic and require police presence. If, against the city's
wishes, a court mandates that he be allowed to demonstrate, then the
decision can be viewed as a forced subsidy of John and correlatively a
forced imposition of costs on others.
Next, consider Joan, who is denied several outlets for her message
that, given her limited resources, would be the most effective: putting
graffiti on the side of city hall, using a loudspeaker at night in a residen-
tial neighborhood, or putting up a pamphlet stand on land that, due to
various zoning laws, is currently unaffordable for her. Why should
Schneider but not Joan get a First Amendment subsidy here?
Finally, consider Jason, who wants the city to build an auditorium
suitable for public lectures and rallies, but who is opposed by Jean, who
would like the city to build more tennis courts because she and others
prefer playing and discussing tennis to attending public lectures, and
Jerry, who wants lower taxes so that he can afford to go to night school.
59. If one objects that the term "subsidy" is rhetorically loaded in favor of the existing set
of entitlements, we can more neutrally ask why we should give the entitlement to the
pamphleteer.
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The O'Brien line of cases raises the same questions. If a medium is
being regulated for non-censorial reasons, then striking down the regula-
tion under the First Amendment imposes a costly First Amendment
easement on others. If Jake wishes to protest inflation by burning an
inexpensive work of art in the lobby of the Treasury Building, presuma-
bly a court will not protect him, even though he has cost each taxpayer
an insignificant amount. Yet, how is Jake different from any other user
of a tangible medium that the government wishes to regulate to avoid
costs to a variety of values? This question is especially relevant since
those values might always be translated into amounts of money that the
taxpayers would pay to preserve them.
Track two also includes such obviously important-to-speech govern-
mental decisions as what resources should be dedicated to the police and
courts, and as a component of that decision, to protecting speakers from
hostile audiences beyond those dedicated to protecting persons from as-
sault and battery generally. Resources that go to protecting speakers are,
of course, unavailable for other public projects, which include such
things as public schools and libraries and the ideas they would otherwise
communicate. Since track two includes all laws and governmental deci-
sions, however, it includes these allocations of resources decisions.
Without a theory of proper information effects, non-content-related
regulations cannot be evaluated under the First Amendment, except in
an arbitrary manner. Schneider did win, of course, and so did the Hare
Krishnas in Lee. But why they and not O'Brien, the sleep-in protesters
in Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence,6° or the many other
actual losers? And if Schneider and the Krishnas, why not my hypothet-
ical Jane, John, Joan, and Jason?
As discussed above, assigning the speech value a constant weight in
the calculus-for instance, equal to a significant governmental interest-
does not help. Without a theory regarding information effects-what
gets said, by whom, to whom, and with what effect-assigning any
weight will be arbitrary. More importantly, because speech interests are
affected regardless of what set of track two laws are chosen, the speech
"constant" appears on both sides of the equation and does not produce a
winner.
An alternative that might be considered would be straightforward
balancing rather than assigning speech an arbitrary constant value.
Under this approach, all of the information at stake under all alternative
60. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
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sets of laws would be examined, as well as all the non-speech values, and
a determination would be made as to which set of laws is superior.
There are obvious practical and institutional objections to such a
balancing proposal. Given that this approach would involve nothing less
than a comparison of all possible entire sets of laws, both for their infor-
mation effects and for their effects on all the non-speech values, the pro-
posal is a practical impossibility for a legislature and surely for a court.
This practical objection should by itself be sufficient to undermine
all track two judicial decisions and to dictate complete judicial with-
drawal from track two. There remains, however, a theoretical objection
to the enterprise as well. In principle, we cannot evaluate the informa-
tion effects of track two laws: Either we assume the viewpoint of one
who does not know what the information at issue will be, in which case
we cannot evaluate it at all, or we assume the viewpoint of one who does
know what the information will turn out to be, in which case we can
evaluate it, but only from a partisan perspective inconsistent with the
First Amendment itself. These two points are discussed below.
(1) Assume Ignorance of What Information Will Turn Out to Be
Information is in some respects a commodity just like toothbrushes,
automobiles, and bananas. We buy it and sell it. When we buy it we
place a value on it in the sense that we decide to pay a particular price for
it. Nevertheless, information is unique as a commodity in this crucial
respect: The value of information, and therefore the price we should pay
for it, is generally unascertainable until it has been purchased and
received.61
For example, the fifty-dollar medical book at the bookstore may
contain information that will save my life or my loved ones' lives. Then
again, it may not. Should I pay the fifty dollars and find out? Similarly,
in deciding whether to buy a seventy-five-dollar electric razor, should I
purchase the issue of Consumer Reports that evaluates it? The magazine
61. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 137, 160, 171 (1984);
KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 151-52 (1971); F. KNIGHT,
RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 348 (1921); J. Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, The Analytics
of Uncertainty and Information-An Expository Survey, 17 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1375, 1395
(1979); see also James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Black-
mail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1438, 1443-44,1448-50 (1992) (pointing out
the paradox resulting from regarding information both as a conceptual precondition for ana-
lyzing markets and as a commodity to be traded in markets); cf. Guido Calabresi, The Poin-
tlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1212 (1991) (arguing that if
transaction costs are taken seriously, including the costs of obtaining new information, we are
always at a Pareto optimal point).
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may save me some money, perhaps an amount greater than the maga-
zine's cost. But I will not know that until I pay the price to get the
magazine.
Interestingly, economic theory is mute here. It cannot tell me
whether information is worth its price, except when I have good actuarial
information about the information itself, such as that there is a one-in-
three chance that Consumer Reports will save me ten dollars on a sev-
enty-five-dollar purchase, which makes it worth a $2.00 asking price.
Economic theory itself normally assumes full or adequate information, or
at least actuarial information about information, 62 which makes eco-
nomic theory largely irrelevant to purchases of information itself.
Economic theory does tell us, however, that the enterprise of pro-
ducing information for sale-for example, what newspapers do-suffers
from a public goods problem. Because information, once purchased, will
be disseminated by the original purchaser for free 63 or at nominal charge,
the producer cannot capture the full public benefit of the information in
the price charged. As a result, if the cost of production is greater than
the price purchasers will pay, though less than the total public benefit of
the information, the information will not be produced even though it
would have been socially beneficial to produce it.64
In view of this inability of producers to recapture the full public
value of the information in the price charged and the resulting underpro-
duction of information, one might argue that we subsidize the production
of information for distribution. 65 There are, however, several difficulties
with this conclusion.
First, there are an indefinite number of activities that might pro-
duce-or might produce if subsidized-information of public benefit.
Without knowing what information would be produced that is not pro-
duced now, how can we determine which information's production costs
should be subsidized?
66
62. Cf. Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9
Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y 62, 69-70 (1992) (arguing, based on knowledge of who is most likely to
have the knowledge necessary for efficient allocations of resources, for a centralized structuring
of a decentralized market).
63. Information is never consumed at no cost to the consumer; there are always at least
the costs of time and'attention. See ANTHONY DowNs, AN EcONOMIc THEORY OF DEMOC-
RACY 209-73 (1957). These costs, however, do not involve payment to the producer.
64. See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REv. 554, 558-68 (1991).
65. Id. at 570-79.
66. Interestingly, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commission of Reve-
nue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983), the Supreme Court held a special tax subsidy for the press to be
unconstitutional because of the dangers of covert viewpoint discrimination inherent in the gov-
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There are several layers to this problem. Because we cannot know
what information will be produced by any information producer if we
subsidize its production, we cannot know whether the information's total
social value-the public's willingness to pay for the information if free-
riding were precluded-will equal its social cost. In turn, this means we
cannot determine which of the many producers to subsidize or at what
level. 67 Moreover, there are other public goods that require protection or
subsidization apart from information, some of them in direct opposition
to information production. In addition, both the content of information
and its production also produce negative externalities not reflected in the
costs because of collective action problems. For example, those who
don't like the noise and congestion of demonstrations, the scandal-
mongering of the tabloids, or the eyesores of campaign posters might, but
for collective action problems, pay off the information producers in ques-
tion to eliminate the negative externalities.
The second general problem with this public goods argument for
subsidizing information production is that its own logic renders it impo-
tent as a track two tool. It highlights a problem information producers
face-they cannot recapture in their price the public value of the infor-
mation they produce. But defining who is a "producer of information"
and what is a "subsidy" requires analytically privileging a certain set of
entitlements and background laws; for it is only against that background
that we identify who is producing information and what is a subsidy. A
track two challenge, however, is a challenge to precisely that set of back-
ground entitlements and laws on First Amendment grounds. With a dif-
ferent set of background entitlements and laws, there would be different
information producers producing--or potentially producing--different
information, who would face the recapture (of costs of production) prob-
lem.68 Paradoxically, the public goods argument works as a potential
track two First Amendment argument only if we first decide on First
Amendment grounds which set of entitlements and background laws to
ernment's singling out the press for special treatment. The Court, however, has been quite
schizophrenic in this regard, hardly blinking at the subsidies of particular viewpoints inherent
in such things as public education, publicly funded research, publicly funded arts, and public
libraries. For example, in Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1442-43 (1991), the Court
upheld a subsidy for the press broader than the one in Minneapolis Star.
67. Indeed, because information is a byproduct of the production of other items, any
producer may claim that he cannot recapture full social value of his product and therefore
should be subsidized.
68. Consider whether we should subsidize those who already produce information for
public distribution or those who would do so if they received a subsidy. Consider further those
who would produce information for public distribution if they did not have to incur the costs
of such subsidies to others?
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privilege; but once that is decided, everything is decided, leaving nothing
for the public goods argument to do. In short, the public goods argu-
ment has no force as a track two First Amendment argument because it
provides no grounds for criticizing the background entitlements and laws
that determine who the information producers will be.
(2) Assume Knowledge of What Information Will Turn Out to Be
The previous Part raised the difficulties that arise for any track two
First Amendment enterprise if we do not know what information will be
gained and what information will be lost under alternative sets of laws.
The difficulties stem from two fundamental points. First, we cannot
evaluate information and whether it is worth the costs required to obtain
it until we actually have it; therefore, because different information will
be gained and lost under every alternative set of track two laws, we have
no way of assessing which of those sets of laws is preferable. Second, the
fact that we will tend to underproduce information as a commodity be-
cause of the opportunity to free-ride is no grounds for making a track
two attack, because each alternative set of track two laws produces its
own distinct set of information that is underproduced.
If now we make the heroic assumption that we know what specific
information will be gained and lost under each alternative set of entitle-
ments and background laws, are we in a better position to evaluate the
information effects of alternative sets of laws?
Yes and no. Yes in the obvious sense that we can and do evaluate
information's importance once we have it. No, however, in the most cru-
cial sense for First Amendment analysis. That is because the First
Amendment expresses as its primary value that government not preempt
individuals' evaluations of information.69 Put differently, the First
Amendment protects a process of citizens' evaluations of information
and forbids governmental preemption of that process by privileging cer-
tain evaluations.
Al believes that knowing intimate facts about Bill Clinton's life is
more important than knowing how Clinton's tax policy will affect the
economy. Barbara believes the opposite. And Charles believes that
knowing how many blades of grass there are in his lawn is more impor-
tant than either Clinton's private life or tax policy. There may be a point
of view from which it is possible to say whether Al or the others are
69. I am using information throughout this Essay in a broad sense, including not just
items of data, but, for example, arguments, and ways of seeing and categorizing.
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correct or incorrect in their evaluations, but whose point of view is it?7°
Each person-you, I, Al, Barbara, and Charles-will believe his or her
point of view to be the correct one; that is why he or she holds that point
of view.
The Krishnas in Lee no doubt believed the information about reli-
gion that they wished to distribute to airport patrons was more impor-
tant than the information conveyed by an airport uncongested and
uncluttered by solicitors and proselytizers and their litter or the informa-
tion that would be produced by the resources used to police and clean up
after the Krishnas. Is it? What if the religious teachings are false or
sinister? What if an uncluttered environment heightens valuable aes-
thetic sensibility?
The point is not that an individual cannot have a point of view about
the values of the competing types of information, or that one point of
view cannot be correct. The point is, rather, that the First Amendment
requires government to treat any point of view on these matters as just
one point of view among many.71 The only point of view it privileges is
its own-namely, that no particular point of view shall be privileged.72
Of course, this view of the First Amendment's central value is con-
testable and contested. For example, some argue that the First Amend-
ment requires only that no "political" position be privileged, and that
only "political" speech and information are protected.73 This position,
70. Of course, for much information, its value will be purely agent-relative. See Schauer,
supra note 5, at 706-13.
71. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in... matters of opinion .... ); Susan M. Gilles, All Truths
Are Equal, But Are Some Truths More Equal Than Others?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 725,
726, 740-41 (1991); cf. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 370 (1991).
Indeed, the liberal ideal observer construct I have described may not even be coher-
ent. Real individuals have more than a bare desire to decide correctly what candi-
dates they should vote for, or what views to hold about others in society, or what
occupation they should pursue, or what products they should buy. They have con-
crete desires and views about products and candidates and occupations. It is possible
that unless one knows what those concrete desires are, one cannot make sense of the
question: what information would this person want in circulation? The bare desire
to reach a correct decision may leave that question unanswerable in principle.
Id.
72. This is paradoxical. Indeed, the First Amendment has been held to protect anti-First
Amendment views, which is also paradoxical. See Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control
Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 173 (1956);
see also Post, Racist Speech, supra note 58, at 303-04 (discussing the paradox of public dis-
course exemplified by tolerating the intolerant).
73. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech-An Inquiry
into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 300 (1978) (proposing that
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however, is, for related reasons, both unhelpful for track two analysis
and also wrong. Regardless of what alternative sets of laws we compare
in assessing track two challenges, political information will be lost and
gained under each. 74 Furthermore, the evaluation of the political infor-
mation at stake surely will be political in the sense that requires govern-
mental nonpartisanship. More fundamentally, the question of what
information has political relevance is itself political.75 If that is true, the
position that the First Amendment protects only political speech devours
itself.
Would track two analysis avoid the "point of view" problem if it
sought "balance" or "representation" or "adequate airing" of points of
view? This tack is equally unavailing. First, how many issues are there,
and how many points of view are there on each? Second, whose position
"represents" a point of view? Third, when has that position been "ade-
quately aired"? The first question, if it is a meaningful one, is not a meta-
physical one but one itself referable to points of view. Moreover, the
number of points of view per issue is not determinable, since any answer
depends on how the "issue" is described and what information and state
of the argument is posited.76 As for representation and adequacy of air-
ing, no one can represent my point of view except me; and that point of
view has not been adequately aired until it is universally accepted. To
illustrate, if people disagree with me, they obviously have not listened or
understood, or they are intellectually deficient. How else can I explain
their disagreement if I still hold my point of view to be correct?
This discussion reveals a deep paradox in First Amendment theory.
There are those, like Owen Fiss and Jiirgen Habermas, who want the
realm of speech to be a realm of pure process, the substantive results of
which are correct because of the purity of the process from which they
emerge.77 Yet, to make the process "fair," they would build in substan-
in principle the First Amendment protects only "political" speech); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (proposing that the
categories of protected speech should consist of speech concerned with governmental behavior,
policy, or personnel).
74. Consider the effect of Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), and International Soci-
ety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S.Ct. 2701 (1992), on the political proposition
that "streets and airports should be free of pamphleteers," a proposition communicated sym-
bolically by the presence of the laws struck down in those cases.
75. Ninety-nine percent of us would agree that the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour has more
relevance to political choices than do re-runs of Gilligan's Island. Yet, how do we convince the
remaining one percent while remaining politically "neutral"?
76. See Strauss, supra note 71, at 349.
77. See JORGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY
(1979); JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1973); Owen
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tive constraints. Fiss wants more diversity, more balance. Habermas
wants to build in the various conditions that define his "ideal speech situ-
ation." Any conception of diversity and balance, however, will be the
product of, and will privilege, particular points of view. Balance and
diversity can only be ascertained relative to an opinion of what points of
view are plausible or sound. 78 Fiss's version of a fair process will be
partisan, and the partisanship deprives any outcome of pure procedural
legitimacy.79 Similarly, Habermas's conditions for the ideal speech situa-
tion build partisan positions on all the major substantive issues into his
M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and
Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986).
78. See Post, Managing Deliberation, supra note 58; Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a
Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 20, 40 (1975); cf. Michelman,
supra note 56, at 103-04 n.47.
There are other arguable cases of unfair impairment by some people's speech of the
value of other people's speech that a committedly liberal constitutional-legal order
may have little choice but to disregard. It may happen that less meritorious argu-
ments backed by an individual speaker's superior personal endowment of wit,
chutzpah, eloquence, or charisma gain undue advantage in the speech market over
more meritorious insights that a slower-witted, duller-spoken person has trouble ar-
ticulating. However, personal handicapping in such circumstances seems not a liber-
ally entertainable possibility. Again, it may happen that what an audience
experiences as comparative cogency and soundness of argument is just a reflex of the
comparative familiarity or conventionality of the ideas being urged. If this is at all a
frequent occurrence, then public-forum doctrines of content-neutral order-mainte-
nance and equal access may be a recipe for ensuring that currently prevalent views
and perspectives will continue to prevail regardless of their responsiveness to the
interests and values of the audience. But by what standard can liberals deal out
'deviance' or 'dissidence' subsidies?
Id. (citations omitted).
79. See Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59
U. CH. L. REV. 225, 251 (1992).
To be sure, if government controlled all the resources, then very little would be
left of the value of free speech. There are two responses, however, to this concern.
First, as classic liberals have always known but socialists have forgotten, a limited
government and a vigorous private sector firmly beyond government's reach are cru-
cial to freedom of the spirit as well as to economic liberty. This is the basis of the old
saying that liberty is indivisible. Since community control over resources is the light
that beckons on the left, the left-to the extent it cares about freedom of the spirit-
must seek out devices that will discipline the government's monopoly in the realm of
ideas. But any such device must consist of an official arbiter (that is, a government
arbiter) to attempt to distribute access to the public forum. And that device cannot
be content-neutral. It must decide which views have been heard too much, which
not enough, and which should not be heard at all. The only content-neutral device
turns out to be a society in which a significant portion of the resources are in private
hands and beyond the reach of government altogether.
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procedural conditions. What comes out of the process will be predeter-
mined by what went into setting it up.8°
In short, a pure free speech process is a vacuous concept. There are
just different background conditions for speech, each of which will lead
to different substantive outcomes.
Post understands the legitimacy difficulty faced by those who, like
Fiss and Habermas, seek to manage free speech. On the other hand, Post
fully appreciates the other side of this paradoxical predicament. 81 For
Fiss, Habermas, and others with similar views are correct that the set of
background entitlements and laws will affect the outcomes of the free
speech process.82 Yet, one such set must always be in place. If we can-
not evaluate that set and compare it with other possible sets in terms of
information effects, we cannot evaluate the most important determinants
of outcomes of free speech, at least not on free speech grounds.
This is the paradox. Track two laws are extremely important in
determining the quality of public debate. Indeed, track two laws have a
much greater effect on speech than track one laws, if relative effects can
be meaningfully measured. Nevertheless, the core First Amendment
value that no partisan point of view be privileged precludes government
from evaluating information gains and losses, which, in turn, means that
track two analysis is precluded by the First Amendment itself.
Again, the point is not just an institutional one about the limits of
courts. It applies to any governmental institution. Legislative evalua-
tions of information, though democratic (unlike judicial evaluations), are
themselves antithetical to the core First Amendment value.
8 3
Finally, one might argue that adopting a comprehensive normative
theory-such as Rawlsianism, utilitarianism, or libertarianism-as the
vantage point for First Amendment analysis provides a basis for evaluat-
ing information gains and losses and thus for evaluating track two laws.
The rejoinder to this position is that although comprehensive normative
theories are in one sense the proper bases for evaluating track two laws,
80. See Strauss, supra note 71, at 352-53; Michael Walzer, Moral Minimalism, in FROM
THE TWILIGHT OF PROBABILITY 3, 3-14 (William R. Shea & Antonio Spadafora eds., 1992).
81. See Post, Managing Deliberation, supra note 58, at 37-38; Post, Racist Speech, supra
note 58, at 287-88; Post, Public Discourse, supra note 58, at 683-85.
82. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 262, 271-77, 294-97; see also Julian N. Eule, Promoting
Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 105, 111-16.
83. Thus, a decision that there shall be public libraries, not public tennis courts, if it is a
decision about the relative values of the information provided by libraries and tennis (and not
just a weighing up of constituents' preferences qua preferences), represents government's en-
dorsement of a partisan political view inconsistent with the First Amendment. See supra text
accompanying notes 57-58.
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they are the proper bases only insofar as they are not distinctly related to
free speech. Rawlsianism, utilitarianism, and libertarianism are
frameworks for assessing the entire corpus juris-to see if it maximizes
liberties and wealth, maximizes aggregate or average welfare, or reflects
libertarian rights-and in that sense they are important to track two
analysis. In that same sense, however, they have nothing to do with
speech or relative information value as distinct issues apart from liberties,
welfare, and libertarian rights. Usually a comprehensive normative the-
ory assumes full information of whatever type the theory makes relevant
and then directs that that information be deployed to produce the results
the theory dictates. Nevertheless, even if we assume the lack of full in-
formation, information effects can only be relevant to the choice of track
two laws in a very restricted way. We would have to assume that the
choice among track two laws was entirely neutral with regard to all val-
ues made relevant by the theory in question, and that relative informa-
tion effects was the only ground for choice. The theory would then
dictate that we choose that set of laws most likely to lead to the informa-
tion upon which the theory itself places the higher value.
Yet, even in this extremely restricted way in which comprehensive
normative theories would be relevant to track two analysis, such laws
pose a First Amendment problem. Presumably the First Amendment,
even if its ultimate justification rests on a comprehensive normative the-
ory, forbids imposing such a comprehensive normative theory on citi-
zens' evaluative decisions. Further, since imposition of a single
comprehensive normative theory is the strongest of all governmental in-
trusions on the citizens' evaluative processes, it is the most antithetical to
the First Amendment.
(3) Summary
If we assume the position of ignorance regarding information ef-
fects-what would get said, to whom, by whom, and to what effect-
under alternative sets of track two laws, then we can make no evaluation
of those sets in terms of information gains and losses. At most we can
assume that under each such set, the deliberate production of informa-
tion will face a recapture problem, a point that is normatively impotent
because it applies to all alternative sets of laws.
On the other hand, if we assume the position of knowing the infor-
mation effects under each alternative set of track two laws, we then face
the problem that all evaluations of such information are positional and
partisan and may not be endorsed by government. Even a comprehen-
sive normative theory underlying the First Amendment will be too
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strong to be a track two tool, since it will usually endorse a set of track
two laws on grounds independent of information gain and loss. More-
over, comprehensive theories are nothing more than partisan positions
that the government may not endorse in attempting to structure public
debate, even if, paradoxically, they themselves provide the justification
for the First Amendment and its proscription of their own endorsement.
B. The Implication of the Failure of Balancing
Track two First Amendment analysis requires that we balance infor-
mation gains and losses and all other values furthered by the entire set of
laws in question against the information gains and losses and all other
values furthered by all the alternative entire sets of laws. We cannot do
this as a practical matter. Perhaps more importantly, we cannot do this
as a theoretical matter. Even if we knew what information each alterna-
tive set of laws would generate, the First Amendment itself forbids gov-
ernment to act on an evaluation of that information. Track two analysis
is not an extension of the First Amendment but a violation of it. Track
Two laws can be evaluated on many grounds-but not on First Amend-
ment ones.
There are two major implications for the First Amendment to be
drawn from this conclusion. Most obviously, the courts should no longer
hear track two challenges to laws. This would not have a great impact
because track two challenges, as discussed earlier, almost never succeed.
The second implication, however, is directed at legislation, not adju-
dication, and is quite far-reaching. For if my analysis is correct, the leg-
islature violates the First Amendment if it adopts and imposes through
law any partisan evaluation of information, which is any evaluation. Es-
sentially, while the government may enact laws based on a variety of
values, it may not constitutionally rely on the value of information
gained or lost in choosing which laws to enact or repeal.
This, in turn, suggests that the government's decisions whether to
build an auditorium to provide a forum for public debates, to fund elec-
tion campaigns, to expand public education, to fund research, and a mul-
titude of other track two and track three decisions resting wholly or in
part on government's evaluation of information rather than its aggrega-
tion of private preferences, are constitutionally problematic.
This implication, however, appears to offend common sense. Do we
not need more fora for public debate, more public funding of elections,
more broadcasting options, more education, and more research? Should
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government not support such endeavors? 84 Yet, how can I answer those
who disagree without presupposing what information such endeavors
would produce and without evaluating that information and its opportu-
nity costs by reference to a controverted, partisan point of view?
Ultimately, track two analysis reveals not only its own First Amend-
ment illicitness, but also the illicitness of all information-conscious legis-
lative decisions regarding the quality and quantity of public discourse.
Consider a legislative debate, such as might have occurred within the
New York City Port Authority prior to Lee, over whether to allow the
sale and distribution of literature inside the airport terminals and thereby
incur the costs of congestion, annoyance, extra policing, clean-up, and so
forth. The legislative body will be aware that if sale and distribution are
not allowed, some passengers will not receive some messages, usually
religious or political, and usually not mainstream. On the other hand, a
clean, uncongested airport, aside from being valuable in itself, also com-
municates various messages to its patrons. Furthermore, the money
saved on clean-up can be used to provide other services-including per-
haps schools and libraries--or can be put in the pockets of taxpayers who
might spend it on information. How is the choice to be made? The legis-
lative body might disregard remote, uncertain, or amorphous informa-
tion effects and focus only on the most direct, certain, and specific effects,
such as the effects on the Hare Krishnas or the LaRoucheites. Even so,
what should it do? Should it count these effects as outweighing the non-
speech costs? Why? Because it sympathizes with the Hare Krishnas and
LaRoucheites and believes others should hear their messages at the cost
of other values and messages? Alternatively, should it count these effects
as outweighed by the costs? Again, why? Legislative evaluation of the
Hare Krishnas' and LaRoucheites' messages seems inevitable if speech
effects are to be taken into account, but such evaluation on closer exami-
nation appears quite illicit.
Alternatively, consider a debate within Congress or the FCC over
whether the broadcast media are sufficiently "diverse" or "balanced" in
the array of information they provide the listeners and viewers in their
markets. This debate can be meaningful only if there are criteria for
identifying degrees of importance of information, 85 criteria for diver-
84. See BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 267-68, 305-07 (1984); Curtis J. Ber-
ger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 646-47
(1991).
85. For example, diversity of political information is more important than diversity of
music formats.
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sity,8 6 and criteria for balance. 87 The choice of such criteria is deeply
evaluative and partisan.
Current Supreme Court track two jurisprudence seems most consis-
tent with the following position: The legislative bodies may enact or
modify track two laws explicitly in order to facilitate speech activities or
to promote balance and diversity so long as the legislature is presumed to
have had no clear impression of what information would be favored and
disfavored, or no particular sympathy for the messages likely to be fa-
vored. Governmental decisions to allow demonstrations, to open facili-
ties for pamphleteering, to build public auditoria and other
communicative fora, to break-up media monopolies, and to subsidize
broad categories of information media will uniformly be upheld, even if
those decisions were premised on some estimate of the relative value of
information lost and gained. 88 Because the content of the information
gained in these cases cannot be known with any certainty when the deci-
sions are made, the decisions are no more arbitrary than had they been
made without regard to information gains and losses. So long as the
legislative body is operating in the dark, the Court will not care that
concern for information effects was what determined the outcome of the
legislative balance.
This analysis explains as well why the Court often strikes down ob-
viously content-based regulations of time, place, and manner. If, for ex-
ample, the legislative body has taken a partisan position in favor of
speech related to labor disputes and against all other speech, 89 or in favor
of non-religious speech and against religious speech,90 the Court will
strike down the time, place, and manner regulation.
86. For example, how many positions are there on labor policy, is a novel free market
position on world trade more or less diverse than a tired Marxist view, and is the latter more
"diverse" relative to mainstream political programming than is religious programming or farm
reports?
87. For example, does a strong speech by Cuomo balance three speeches by Quayle?
88. It is difficult to come up with unambiguous support for this statement because gov-
ernmental decisions are almost always challenged on First Amendment grounds when they
obviously restrict speech or obviously favor some subjects or viewpoints, and not when they
subsidize speech in an apparently nonpartisan manner. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
occasionally faced First Amendment challenges to governmental speech subsidies. See, eg.,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-108 (1976) (holding federal subsidy of election campaigns
constitutional); Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding fairness
doctrine in broadcasting constitutional); cf. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997,
3025-26 (1990) (allowing preference for minority ownership in awarding broadcasting
licenses).
89. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
90. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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Thus, when the government makes a track two decision based on
information effects, the Court will sustain the decision if it believes that
the legislature could not have evaluated information effects in a partisan
manner. Where the legislative decision appears to be partisan, however,
the Court will invalidate it.
Track two First Amendment jurisprudence is destined to fail be-
cause no track two theory is available that is consistent with the core
value of the First Amendment--citizen autonomy regarding the evalua-
tion of information. The courts can strike down and, as in Schneider and
Lee, have struck down laws in track two cases. Nonetheless, track two
judicial decisions can only be arbitrary or illicit.
IV. Implications for Track One and Track
Three Jurisprudence
A. Track One
The foregoing analysis of track two jurisprudence has profound im-
plications for track one and track three. Essentially, its lesson is that
track one and track three decisions cannot be justified by reference to the
value of information at stake.
The content of speech-its message-has enormous capacity to in-
flict harm on values that government may legitimately seek to protect.91
Yet the courts have consistently struck down attempts to interdict the
receipt of such harmful messages unless the messages fall within a few
unprotected categories.92 The courts frequently justify this protection by
reference to the value of the message.
Consider the following examples of track one jurisprudence. De-
fendant publishes a false and defamatory statement about a public figure
plaintiff or satirizes a public figure plaintiff in an offensive manner that
causes emotional distress. 93 Alternatively, plaintiff public employee
makes a public criticism of defendant public employer that might ad-
versely affect office morale. 94 The Supreme Court protects the speaker
against sanctions in these cases and justifies protection on the ground
that not protecting the speech would deter speech, the value of which is
91. See Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHIcS (forth-
coming 1993); Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1992)
[hereinafter Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech].
92. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
93. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
94. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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expected to outweigh the harm prevented by deterrence. 95 If the previ-
ous Part's argument is correct, however, the Court cannot make the
judgment of relative value for two reasons: it cannot know what infor-
mation will be lost or who will lose it through deterrence; and it cannot
place a value on that information such that its value can be compared
with the values the government is seeking to protect.
96
Consider the protection tort law provides against revelation of pri-
vate and embarrassing information. Should that protection withstand a
track one First Amendment challenge? If so, then certain information
will be lost to certain audiences. We do not know, however, what that
information will be. Moreover, although any one of us may place a value
on that information if we discover it, we have only our plural individual
vantage points from which to assign a value to it.
On the other hand, consider the multitude of other track one First
Amendment doctrines that purport to protect speech because of its infor-
mation value despite the real and tangible harms it causes. The First
Amendment law regarding defamation, regarding speech that induces
others to engage in harmful conduct, and regarding pornography can be
viewed as resting on the fear of "chilling" the communication of valuable
information. 97 Frederick Schauer convincingly makes the point that our
decision not to chill defamatory, inciting, or (soft-core) pornographic
speech does not require that we allow the harm from some speech to
remain on its immediate victims.98 For example, we can shift its costs to
the public through some sort of social insurance mechanism so that those
costs truly are the costs we bear as the price of freedom of speech. Both
Schauer and the Supreme Court fail to address, however, the loss of in-
95. See, eg., id. at 571-75 (holding that a teacher's exercise of his right to speak on issues
of public importance many not be the basis for his dismissal from public employment); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-83 (1964) (holding that the public interest in
having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance precludes a public official
from receiving damages for defamation unless the statements were made with reckless disre-
gard for the truth or with knowledge of their falsity).
96. This last statement needs to be qualified in this respect: Sometimes the information
that is suppressed by censorship bears on the same value that government is seeking to further
through censorship and thus reveals the censorship's self-defeating nature. In such a case the
valuation of the information is no less legitimate than the valuation on which its suppression is
premised. For instance, if the suppression of speech in the name of copyright and patent laws
is meant to produce a net increase in ideas that can be copyrighted or patented by giving
authors and inventors the incentive of legal monopoly, then that justification for suppression
would be undermined by a showing that copyright and patent laws lead to fewer ideas that can
be copyrighted or patented than would exist in their absence.
97. Although these aspects of First Amendment law might rest on other grounds, such as
some conception of the right to autonomy. See infra Part IV.C.
98. See Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, supra note 91.
April 1993]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
formation that any method of allocating the costs of harms entails.
Every possible legal regime-the law of defamation prior to New York
Times v. Sullivan, the Sullivan regime itself,99 or Schauer's social insur-
ance system'°°-will produce its own distinctive supply and type of in-
formation. An information effects approach to track one jurisprudence is
unavailing.
Other track one maneuvers, such as denying value to certain speech,
are equally unavailing. Consider, for example, the categories of hate
speech and pornography. While they undoubtedly cause harm, are they
valuable? Alon Harel argues that they are not. 10 1 Harel places hate
speech and pornography in a category called "abhorrent speech." Ab-
horrent speech lacks value, not because it communicates no ideas, and
not because its ideas are not important or political in some sense, but
because its ideas do not make up part of our political discourse, a dis-
course that extends only to those values and ideas capable of generating
legitimate political obligations.102 In other words, because we cannot le-
gitimately act on racist or sexist values, we cannot assign First Amend-
ment value to speech supporting such values.
Harel's position can be viewed as an outright denial of my conten-
tion in the previous Part that the core First Amendment principle is
preventing any institution from assigning values to messages. Harel as-
serts that "[t]here are some values and ideas that are so abhorrent that
they are not part of political discourse. The test is the degree to which
values and ideas that purport to shape the nature of our political obliga-
tions can succeed in doing so.' 1 03
Harel recognizes that courts have consistently granted First Amend-
ment protection to what he labels abhorrent speech, but argues that such
protection is a mistake. He rejects, quite correctly, any notion that all
political messages are equally valuable:
Any participant in political discourse believes that her or his idea is
more valuable than others; indeed, the reason why the participant
holds a particular political position is precisely because he or she be-
lieves that this political idea is more valuable than the alternatives. If
no political idea were more valuable than any other, we could arbitrar-
ily choose any political view and govern our lives in accordance with
it. The claim that all political ideas are equally valuable is inconsistent
with the basic assumptions of participants in political discourse. The
99. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282-84.
100. See Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, supra note 91, at 1338-55.
101. Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theory of Unpro-
tected Speech, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1887 (1992).
102. Id. at 1889.
103. Id. at 1889-90.
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equal protection principle applies not because all political ideas are
equal but in spite of the unequal value of political statements.'14
He then goes on to consider various theories that might nonetheless sup-
port First Amendment protection for abhorrent speech and finds them
all wanting.
Most significantly for my purposes, Harel rejects institutional justifi-
cations for protecting abhorrent speech.105 He does so for two reasons.
First, he says that institutional incompetence is inconsistent with actual
First Amendment decisionmaking. For example, courts assess the value
of particular instances of political discourse when they ask whether ob-
scene speech meets the Miller test 106 for unprotected status. 10 7 The
courts also assess its value when they declare it to be more valuable-and
thus subject to greater protection-than commercial speech. 108 Second,
the incompetence argument is circular in that courts can become good at
assessing the value of speech if First Amendment doctrine is changed to
allow them to do so. 10 9
Harel is responding here to an argument that all governmental insti-
tutions should be deemed incompetent to assess the value of speech. Yet
his response is limited to courts. Moreover, his response misses the par-
ticular type of governmental incompetence at the core of the First
Amendment. First Amendment concerns are not implicated if a court or
a legislature assesses the value of arguments and information worse than
you, I, or anyone else would. The concern is that a court's or legisla-
ture's assessment-like yours, mine, or anyone else's-will be in an im-
portant sense just another point of view that should not be privileged by
government. You, I, and most other people believe-no, we know-that
bigotry is wrong. We also know that the First Amendment is a good
thing. Further, what we know the government is quite likely to know as
well. Nevertheless, the government is forbidden by the First Amend-
ment to interdict ideas it believes to be false, including, not just the idea
that bigotry is good, but, paradoxically, the idea the First Amendment is
bad.
Harel, in fact, believes that in arguing for nonprotection for abhor-
rent speech, he is arguing for a minor amendment of First Amendment
jurisprudence. The ideas expressed by abhorrent speech are not just
wrong, says Harel, they are ideas that cannot provide the basis for legiti-
104. Id. at 1914.
105. Id. at 1915-16.
106. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).




mate political obligation. Harel contrasts abhorrent speech, such as hate
speech and pornography, with pro-life and pro-choice speech regarding
abortion. Pro-lifers regard the pro-choicers as advocating murder. The
latter regard the former as advocating subordination of women. Neither
murder nor subordination are acceptable political values, so it might
seem that Harel would allow the silencing of one group by the other.
Harel denies this consequence of his position. He says that the underly-
ing values of the pro-life and pro-choice positions-protection of life and
equality-are values that can sustain legitimate political obligations, even
if, from the point of view of the other side, these values have been
misapplied. 110
This maneuver leads Harel into an impossible dilemma. All propo-
nents of abhorrent speech are expressing, at some level of generality, per-
fectly legitimate political values. As Harel notes, Nazis can argue that
their speech conveys ideals of patriotism.'1 11 Likewise, racists and sexists
can talk about respecting a natural moral order. Harel's response is
weak:
A judgment must be made in each case as to the prominence of the
abhorrent values and that of the legitimate ones. Speech should be
denied or granted protection only after careful examination of the
complex of values the speech conveys and reinforces. All discourse
conveys a variety of different and contradictory values. Identifying the
primary values and ideas conveyed by a particular form of discourse
requires more than the identification of the explicit agenda advocated
by the participants.1
12
There is no way in principle for a court, or anyone else, to disentan-
gle the question of whether a political position is wrong from the ques-
tion of whether a political position expresses legitimate political values.
At some level of generality, almost any political position, including "ab-
horrent" ones, expresses legitimate political values. Yet, at another level
of generality, any political question expresses legitimate political values
only if it is correct.
Harel's argument purports to be critical, and not descriptive, of
track one jurisprudence. He is seeking to reform, not legitimize, the ju-
risprudential status quo. I am also critical of many First Amendment
precedents. My argument against Harel is not that he is at odds with
First Amendment jurisprudence, but that he is more fundamentally at
odds with a central value underlying the First Amendment. Whether an
idea can form the basis for political obligations cannot be disentangled
110. Id. at 1925-26.
111. Id. at 1926.
112. Id.
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from the question of whether the idea is correct. Furthermore, if the
correctness of an idea is the touchstone for its track one protectability,
the First Amendment is not merely drained of its central meaning but is
turned inside out.
Nonetheless, Harel and I agree on one thing: track one First
Amendment jurisprudence protects more speech than it can justify pro-
tecting. Harel's point is that some speech that is currently protected is
valueless. My point is that placing a positive value on speech-as track
one jurisprudence currently does in dealing with contending values of
privacy, confidentiality, property, and sensibility-is itself problematic.
B. Track Three
If my arguments are correct, they reveal a major problem with what
I have called track three governmental decisions, decisions by the gov-
ernment to promote its own views. These would seem to be the most
suspect according to the analysis I have applied to the other tracks, yet
the Court treats them quite deferentially. There are, of course, a number
of track three decisions that deal with speech appurtenant to government
enterprises that are not principally information oriented. For example,
when the government runs the military, the police, public hospitals, the
welfare department, and other enterprises, it has a concern with what
gets said that is no different from the concern a private enterprise would
have. It wants its welfare workers to give clients advice about welfare,
not politics or religion. It wants the police department's bulletin board
to be used for notices of seminars, union meetings, and shift information.
In short, the government wants to make sure that the information neces-
sary for the success of its enterprises be conveyed, and that it not be
drowned out by extraneous information. 113 If government's enterprises
113. Several cases fall into this realm. See, ag., Minnesota State Bd. for Community Col-
leges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984) (restrictions on who could participate in college govern-
ance institutions); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)
(restrictions on who could communicate through teachers' mail system). More problematic,
because they disclose the lack of a clear boundary between government's legitimate concern for
its own enterprises and its more suspect concern with public debate over its effectiveness, are
cases in which employee speech is suppressed because of morale effects. See Rankin v. Mc-
Pherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (balancing potential value of speech by public employee against
potential for undermining her effectiveness); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (uphold-
ing dismissal based upon speech by public employee affecting office morale and undermining
employer's authority); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding employee's
speech on matters of public importance cannot be a basis of dismissal); Robert C. Post, Be-
tween Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA
L. REv. 1713, 1812-16 (1987). Ironically, the concern for morale is less problematic the
broader the muzzling that occurs. See, eg., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding
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are legitimate, then so too is its concern with speech that interferes with
those enterprises.
When government becomes an educator or patron of scholarship,
research, and the arts, the tension with the First Amendment's central
values is most acute. If the government may not establish an evaluative
orthodoxy regarding citizens' exchanges of information, why may it do
so when it speaks itself, as it does through public education, the funding
of research, scholarship, the arts, public broadcasting, family planning
counseling, and myriad other enterprises? Does the First Amendment
speak differently to government's evaluation of information when it is
using citizens' tax monies as opposed to censoring citizens' speech or
manipulating time, place, and manner regulations in order to favor and
disfavor certain subjects and viewpoints?
I cannot square the Court's general concern with content discrimi-
nation and its currently quite permissive attitude toward track three gov-
ernmental speech. Why the government may monetarily subsidize
speech that promotes live birth over abortion but may not subsidize labor
speech by granting an exemption from a general ban on demonstrations
near schools is a theoretical mystery. Perhaps the Court believes that
partisan use of resources is more of a threat to the First Amendment
when the resources are parks, streets, sidewalks, and perhaps airports
than when the resources are tax monies. Nevertheless, current track
three jurisprudence is surely in need of a theoretical reconciliation with
the principle of governmental evaluative neutrality that underlies the
First Amendment.1
14
regulation banning political speech from military base); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding regulation banning political advertisements from public transport).
114. For scholarly commentary on track three First Amendment jurisprudence, see gener-
ally MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983), Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, and the 'Pall of
Orthodoxy'.- Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, Robert D. Kamen-
shine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104
(1979), Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980), Cass R. Sunstein,
Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889 (1986), and Edward H. Ziegler, Jr.,
Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partnership, 20 B.C. L. REV.
578 (1980).
My fanatical conclusion regarding track three jurisprudence could be softened somewhat
if the legislature were allowed to act on premises on which there were a broadbased consensus.
Thus, the schools could teach that the earth is round, that America was discovered by Colum-
bus in 1492, and that 2 X 2 = 4. The legislature could fund medical research and basic
physics but not astrology. See infra text accompanying notes 122-124. It could also decide
that public libraries and public theaters were more valuable than more shopping malls. More-
over, the courts could develop a track three jurisprudence that would focus on structural is-
sues, such as how decisions about curricula, collections, or research, for example, are made
within track three governmental entities, with a First Amendment preference for decentraliza-
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C. Autonomy and First Amendment Jurisprudence
This Essay has asked the reader to accept the proposition that a
central principle underlying the First Amendment is that the government
is forbidden to impose on citizens a particular evaluation of information,
ideas, and arguments. This proposition entails that any governmental
decision, whether on track one, two, or three, is illegitimate if premised
upon the government's evaluation of the decision's information effects,
even if government's ultimate aim is to prevent some harm more tangible
than ignorance or falsehood.' 15 Government must act for reasons that
do not require citizens to believe, or be ignorant of, certain things.
While there are many theories of freedom of speech and the First
Amendment, I will not attempt to canvass them, much less recite the
problems internal to each. 116 What is important is that those theories
generally do not dispute the central principle upon which I have been
relying, but rather, attempt to justify that principle by reference to a still
broader aim, such as pursuit of truth, democratic self-governance, self-
realization, or distrust of government.
The major competitor to consequentialist theories of freedom of
speech, those that depend upon evaluating information differentially, are
those deontological theories that are based upon some conception of indi-
vidual autonomy.' 17 According to these theories, the paradigmatic viola-
tion of freedom of speech is an attempt to penalize or interdict the
sending or receipt of a message because of the fear that the audience will,
on account of the message, believe things to be true and good that are not
and, as a result of that belief, act to its or others' detriment. If someone
tion and professionalism. The legislature, however, could not take sides on widely disputed
issues. Moreover, this concession to legislative assessments of the value of information would
not entail any judicial track two role (unless one took the position that the First Amendment
was an affirmative command to produce a certain level of education and a certain kind of
public discourse).
For a more permissive view of track three government action, see David A. Strauss, The
Liberal Virtues, in VIRTUE 197, 202 (John W. Chapman & W. Galston eds., 1992) (arguing
that the government should be able to teach "liberal virtues," presumably even if liberal virtues
include the unwillingness to force others to accept those virtues).
115. Government must, of course, evaluate information and find facts for its own pur-
poses. It must decide questions of adjudicative fact (Did Mary rob John?) and questions of
legislative fact (Will clearcutting in national forests worsen erosion?). The question is not
whether government may evaluate information for its purposes but whether its purposes may
legitimately include concern that citizens receive information government deems valuable.
116. For a discussion of theories of freedom of speech and their problems, see Lawrence
Alexander & Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle, 78 Nw. U. L. Rav.
1319 (1983).
117. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204
(1972); Strauss, supra note 71, at 356-57.
April 1993] TROUBLE ON TRACK TWO
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
wishes to convince me that socialism is the best governmental program,
then according to autonomy theories of freedom of speech, government
cannot attempt to prevent me from hearing these arguments, even if gov-
ernment is convinced that the arguments are wrong and afraid that if I
hear them, I will cast a misguided vote for a catastrophic socialism.
Autonomy theories lead to a First Amendment that is narrower
than current doctrine in some respects, but broader in others. Most im-
portant for my purposes, autonomy theories eliminate track two from the
First Amendment altogether.1 18 Autonomy theories also revise track
one in several respects. They arguably expand protection for commer-
cial, pornographic, and other forms of speech that receive no, or reduced,
track one protection where the government's concern is that the audience
will be persuaded of error in action or belief. 1t 9 On the other hand, First
Amendment protection of speech invasive of privacy might not be
granted to the same extent as at present, since limiting access to private
information for the victim's sake does not, at least arguably, infringe on
the audience's deliberative autonomy. The precise implications of auton-
omy theories for track one will, of course, depend upon the particular
conception of autonomy they embrace, but there is no doubt that all of
them will be revisionary to some extent.120
118. This is not true when a content-neutral law is enacted because of its content effects, a
case that has always been rightly considered to be on track one.
119. A classic example is Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328
(1986), in which the Court upheld Puerto Rico's ban on casino advertising in Puerto Rico, a
ban premised on a fear that the audience would be persuaded to gamble, to its and Puerto
Rico's detriment.
120. Autonomy theories have difficulty dealing with false statements of facts upon which
the audience might detrimentally rely. Scanlon believed his conception of autonomy prevented
government from penalizing such statements, a result that led him to abandon his autonomy
theory of freedom of expression. See T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories
of Expression, 40 U. PiTT. L. REV. 519, 532 (1979). Strauss believes that his autonomy theory
can distinguish between false statements of fact, which government may regulate without vio-
lating the First Amendment, and actions of government which violate the First Amendment
because they manipulate audience deliberation. See Strauss, supra note 71, at 357, 366-68. He
also believes that his theory can maintain the distinction between private and governmental
attempts to manipulate audiences, with the latter forbidden by the theory and the former pro-
tected against governmental restriction. Id. at 362-63. I believe both of Strauss's distinctions
are problematic. Both depend upon the existence of a distinction between false or misleading
statements of fact and false or misleading statements of some other kind. (The private manipu-
lation Strauss would permit government to restrict is manipulation through false statements of
fact.) But as Strauss himself acknowledges, the line between statements of fact and First-
Amendment-protected political statements is difficult to maintain because the latter, to the
extent one thinks they are wrong, usually are wrong in some factual aspect. Id. at 366 n.76.
Whether lowering taxes will increase the deficit is a factual question. Government might be-
lieve that my position, that it will, is incorrect because my predictive models, my information,
or my inferences are flawed as a matter of fact. The same criticism can be levelled at the
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Autonomy theories of freedom of speech, as opposed to consequen-
tialist theories, are quite consistent with the core First Amendment prin-
ciple of governmental neutrality in evaluating ideas. Indeed, that core
principle derives from and is an expression of the value of autonomy. Of
course, the value of autonomy has implications far beyond speech and
government neutrality regarding ideas. In that sense, autonomy theories
do not specially justify freedom of speech. 121
D. Categories of Speech and the First Amendment
One approach to free speech and the First Amendment limits the
protection to certain categories of information, such as political and reli-
gious information. Any of the First Amendment theories discussed
distinction in the realm of professional ethics between misstating in one's brief the record or
the courts' holdings in the area and making an argument that one believes will sound persua-
sive but that one also believes is logically fallacious. Cf Fried, supra note 79, at 239-41 (asking
whom could we trust to ferret out falsehood). In general, much more needs to be said about
the ethics of conveying and withholding information, including when we must publicize the
full bases of our actions, when we may withhold information in the hope others will be
deceived, and when we can use bad arguments to corrupt others for good ends. See Larry
Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHics 315, 325-29 (1985).
Strauss proposes the following test for when government may restrict private manipula-
tive statements: Government may restrict private manipulative statements whenever a hypo-
thetical individual with no desire other than reaching the best decision would want the speech
restricted. Strauss, supra note 71, at 369. The problem with the test is that it depends on the
level of generality at which the manipulation is described and thus yields no determinate an-
swers. But see Fried, supra note 79, at 236-37 (arguing that audience has no right not to
receive unwanted messages).
Interestingly, autonomy theories of freedom of speech do not appear to protect statements
that the audience does not wish to hear, such as statements designed solely to insult the audi-
ence but not to persuade others. Indeed, autonomy theories may not even protect speech
meant to persuade others if the government's purpose in forbidding the speech is not to pre-
vent the persuasion but is instead to protect other values, such as privacy, confidentiality,
property (in ideas), sensibility (from insult and offense), and equal opportunity (from harass-
ment, assuming the sense of harassment is not merely concern about others' being persuaded).
Perhaps we can say that the rightful sphere of autonomy of a speaker and his willing audience
is infringed whenever government acts to interdict speech because the speech insults, offends,
or distresses third parties or an unwilling audience if the harms to the third parties are caused
by their beliefs about what others believe. See Larry Alexander, Harm, Offense, and Morality,
in READING FEINBERG (Howard McGary ed., forthcoming) (manuscript at 34-37, on file with
author); see also JUDrrH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 253-57 (1990) (causing
belief-mediated distress to another does not infringe that person's rights). But see id. at 354-56
(discussing legislative ability to prohibit behavior causing belief-mediated distress). It is not
clear whether autonomy theories can be extended to invalidate governmental interdiction of
insulting or offending speech, or extended even further to invalidate protections of privacy or
reputation. If not, then perhaps very few governmental track one laws infringe the rightful
sphere of speaker or audience autonomy. In other words, autonomy theories may lead to a
much, much narrower track one First Amendment than we currently have.
121. See Alexander & Horton, supra note 116, at 1356-57.
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above can be applied broadly so as to include all information or applied
more narrowly so as to include only a subset of information. Likewise,
the central principle upon which I have been relying can be limited to
only certain categories of information.
A "categories" approach to free speech and its jurisprudence has
powerful proponents in the literature, 122 as well as considerable prece-
dential support. 123 It also has a powerful appeal. Most of us believe that
government should not make retail decisions--censorial or advocative-
about the value of specific items of information, such as that the teach-
ings of the Hare Krishnas are false or wicked, that socialism is not wor-
thy of consideration, or that feminist legal theory is muddled. Moreover,
most of us believe that government should not be authorized to censor
"unreasonable" views or to advocate "reasonable" ones because we do
not trust the government's ability to distinguish what it believes to be
unreasonable from what it believes to be incorrect. 124 On the other hand,
most of us think it reasonable to believe that political and religious infor-
mation is, on average, more valuable than other kinds of information, for
example, backyard gossip, the common fare of supermarket tabloids, or
"trivia."
So long as the common consensus is that some categories of infor-
mation are on average more valuable than others, we might believe that
government may legitimately distinguish among the categories but not
within them. Of course, we would also have to believe that government is
capable of determining in most cases the category into which various
information falls. 125 This does not mean that the line between, say, polit-
ical speech and commercial speech must be bright and susceptible to for-
malistic application. It does mean, however, that the line cannot be so
122. The most powerful proponent is Frederick Schauer. See Frederick Schauer, Catego-
ries and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981).
123. The Supreme Court has treated adult movies and books and commercial speech as
"low value" speech, and has treated pornography and other types of speech as having no value.
See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980) (commercial speech); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 424 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)
(adult movies and books); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (pornography); see also
Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 547 (1989) (discussing the division of
speech into categories according to value). Within the defamation area, the Court has distin-
guished speech about matters of "public concern" from purely private speech. See Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985).
124. All views that we believe to be incorrect we believe to be unreasonable given the
information we possess.
125. To take an oft-cited example, does an advertisement urging lifting of restrictions on
domestic oil production count as "political speech" or "commercial speech," and is the answer
dependent on whether it is paid for by Common Cause or Mobil Oil? See David F. McGowan,
Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359 (1990).
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vague that the majority of cases are incapable of principled categoriza-
tion. If the latter were true, then not only would the categories be ma-
nipulable, but the judgments of higher and lower average value would
look insupportable.
This categorical approach helps to justify those aspects of track one
and track three jurisprudence that I found troubling. Speech about pub-
lic officials, public figures, or matters of public concern receives protec-
tion in the defamation and privacy contexts that purely private speech
does not. The public schools' choice to teach American history, or cer-
tain topics within it, rather than to count blades of grass or memorize the
phone book is justifiable, though teaching the superiority of Democrats
over Republicans is not.
Nonetheless, a categorical approach does nothing to justify track
two decisionnaking. No matter what track two laws the government
adopts, information will be lost, and information in each category will be
lost. Change the laws, and you change what gets said, by whom, to
whom, and to what effect with respect to politics, religion, commerce,
and every other possible category.
126
More importantly perhaps, a categorical approach relies on the rea-
sonableness of imposing an evaluative ranking on everyone. You and I
may agree that political speech is more valuable than the typical contents
of the National Enquirer. Indeed, almost everyone would agree with us,
including almost every reader of the National Enquirer. Yet, what makes
our judgment reasonable, such that we may legitimately impose it on a
solitary dissenter, that does not make my judgment that Bill Clinton is
superior to George Bush, or that most multi-culturalist apologia are rub-
bish, "reasonable" as well? Controversiality surely does not determine
reasonableness as a matter of legitimate governmental action. As an epi-
stemic matter, we can be more confident of judgments with which most
others would concur. Nevertheless, if that is what is at stake, freedom of
speech looks less like a protection of the lonely dissenter and more like a
crude and costly bulwark against entrenching error. Furthermore, a
noncontroversiality approach to the relative value of categories of speech
does not, in principle, prevent categorization within categories such as
political or religious speech that would cordon from protection political
or religious views that almost all of us believe are worthless.
Robert Post adopts something akin to a categorical approach in
track one analysis. He asks whether particular speech is part of "public
126. See supra text accompanying notes 57 and 74.
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discourse."' 127 If so, it receives First Amendment protection, though per-
haps not absolute protection. The question whether speech is part of
public discourse is, as Post admits, a deeply evaluative one regarding the
relation of the speech to a proper conception of democratic decisionmak-
ing.128  The problem is that any conception of the autonomy required by
democracy will be based on an evaluation regarding autonomy's requisite
knowledge, skill, and character that, from another angle, can be viewed
as a heteronymous imposition. Post argues that this paradox of the het-
eronymous construction of autonomy is, like other antinomies such as
that of free will and determinism, unavoidable, and should therefore be
embraced. If Post is correct, something like a categorical approach is




One of the clearest expressions of the core principle of the First
Amendment, an expression that reveals the value of autonomy underly-
ing that principle, is Charles Fried's:
127. See Robert Post, Personal Correspondence with Author, Nov. 23, 1992 (on file with
the Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter Post, Personal Correspondence]; Post, Racist Speech,
supra note 58, at 279-85; see also Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the
Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REv. 103, 116-18, 151-52 (1992)
(distinguishing public discourse, which government may not coerce, from utterances outside
the scope of public discourse).
128. See Post, Personal Correspondence, supra note 127.
129. Post believes, contrary to my position, that there is a tenable track two jurisprudence.
Id. Post would not conflate, as I have done, public forum analysis and symbolic speech analy-
sis. His focus would be on the former, which he would recast as an analysis of the health of
media of communication. The question of what is a medium of communication, like a newspa-
per, as opposed to an expressive act, like burning a draft card, would be a sociological one
addressed to how we, as a society, understand such things. The First Amendment analysis
would ask how a time, place, or manner regulation affects a medium of communication's
health.
I am generally less sanguine than Post about entrusting courts with deciding subtle ques-
tions of sociology such as whether and when "we" understand an activity to be a medium of
communication. Even if I were perfectly happy with entrusting the courts with that question,
however, I cannot imagine on what ground they would assess a regulation's effect on a me-
dium's "health." The latter assessment assumes a normative baseline regarding well-function-
ing media of communication, and no judgment about that baseline can be divorced from
judgments of the baseline's information effects. Are newspapers "healthy"? Is television? Has
placing graffiti on others' property become a medium of expression, and, if so, is it "healthy"?
Post criticizes Owen Fiss's and Cass Sunstein's urge to manage democratic deliberation, but
his approach to public forum analysis commits him to precisely the same evaluative judgments
with which he saddles Fiss and Sunstein. See Post, Managing Deliberation, supra note 58, at
29-38.
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There are famous difficulties in defining these spheres of liberty against
encroachment by the actions of others-one man's liberty is another's
constraint-and many have despaired of deriving any practical conclu-
sions from this principle as it relates to laws bearing on conduct. But
the way is much clearer with respect to thought, expression and per-
suasion. There the claim to liberty runs directly to the foundational.
Our ability to deliberate, to reach conclusions about our good, and to
act on those conclusions is the foundation of our status as free and
rational persons. No conviction forced upon us can really be ours at
all. Limits may be put on my actions insofar as my actions impinge on
others, but my status as a rational sovereign requires that I be free to
judge for myself what is good and how I shall arrange my life in the
sphere of liberty that the similar spheres of others leave me. I cede
authority to the state to draw the necessary concrete boundaries be-
tween our respective spheres of action. But no such necessity requires,
indeed self-respect forbids, that I cede to the state the authority to
limit my use of my rational powers. That is why lying, while not the
most damaging offense to another's moral right, is one of the clearest.
It is also why the state has no claim to dominion over our minds: what
we believe, what we are persuaded to believe, and (derivatively) what
others may try to persuade us to believe.
130
It should be obvious that if Fried is correct, there is no place for a
track two jurisprudence in the First Amendment. However, track one
and track three jurisprudence remain. The government actions that in-
voke track three are quite problematic; the shape of track one is difficult
to discern, though autonomy theories would undoubtedly require some
changes in current track one doctrine. In a true track two case, however,
there is no toehold for finding government's actions or laws to violate the
First Amendment.
This conclusion is, of course, deeply paradoxical. Track two laws
have profound effects on what gets said, by whom, and to what effect,
and they thus have a profound effect on what we believe and value. Yet
because the First Amendment's core principle enjoins government-in-
cluding the courts-from deciding what we should believe and value, the
First Amendment disables government from dealing with the belief and
value effects of its track two laws.
This paradox, of course, extends beyond track two. The absence of
education surely undermines our autonomy, but government-run
schools, which must decide what shall be taught and what shall not, raise
a profound track three First Amendment problem. 31 And track one
130. Fried, supra note 79, at 233 (footnotes omitted).
131. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism as Neutral Dialogue: Man and Manna in the Lib-
eral State, 28 UCLA L. REv. 816, 853-58 (1981).
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analysis paradoxically disables government from protecting our auton-
omy from private manipulative and deceptive speech. 132
That the First Amendment contains paradoxes should not be sur-
prising. The First Amendment is a feature of liberalism, which gives
pride of place to individual autonomy. Autonomy, however, is a para-
doxical value. Enshrined in the First Amendment, it tells us that even
when we are convinced we know what is correct and wish to keep others
from falling into errors of belief and value, we may do so only with our
own private resources and acting within our own private domain. We
are forbidden to enlist the weapons of the state, even to save others' au-
tonomy and the First Amendment itself. 133
132. See Strauss, supra note 71, at 362-65.
133. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming November 1993).
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